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ABSTRACT 
Yemen is an oil-exporting and food-importing country on the Arabian Peninsula with persistently high 
levels of poverty. The impacts of the food, fuel, and financial global crises are likely to further complicate 
preexisting conditions of internal conflicts, decreasing oil revenues, and governance failure. The latest 
official growth numbers date back to precrisis levels; new estimates are subject to much debate; and the 
current state of poverty in Yemen remains unclear. In this paper, a consistent economic framework is 
presented to help close this information gap and to better understand growth and poverty dynamics during 
crises. Results show that economic growth in Yemen accelerated during the food and fuel crises in 2008 
because oil-driven growth dominated the negative growth impacts of the food crisis. However, this oil-
driven growth has not been pro-poor; in fact, poverty in both rural and urban areas rises sharply in 2008. 
The financial crisis in 2009 impacts Yemen mainly through the drop in oil prices and a reduction in 
remittances and thereby sharply slows growth, including agricultural growth. This growth decline hits 
households hard and compounds the poverty effects of the food crisis. Model results indicate that poverty 
has increased to 42.8 percent in 2009, an increase of 8 percentage points from 2005–2006, when it was 
34.8 percent. Poverty continues to be much higher in rural areas, where almost half of all people lived in 
poverty in 2009, compared with 29.9 percent in urban areas. These estimates can be considered 
conservative because we do not account for conflicts and natural disasters that recently hit the country. 
Keywords: global economic crises, conflict, growth, poverty, Yemen vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite early signs of a global recovery, scattered evidence suggests that many developing countries 
might have lost years of previous economic growth and poverty reduction gains. In fact, developing 
countries have been hit twice during the past two years. The food and fuel crises of 2007–2008 have led 
to spiking inflation, deteriorating current account balances, and increasing government deficits in many 
countries. Due to high food and fuel prices, 132 million people might have fallen back into poverty 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008). By mid-2008, a sharp reversal from the food and oil price spikes tamed 
inflation and sparked hope for a quick recovery. Then the financial crisis, in development since the end of 
2007, turned into a global recession by the end of 2008. In 2009 it became clear that sharply shrinking 
global trade, foreign direct investments, remittances, and tourism receipts would make a quick recovery 
elusive in most developing countries. Not only are many developing countries highly dependent on these 
sources of income, but they also often lack the resources to effectively respond to crises and cushion the 
negative impacts through fiscal stimulus and other measures. Chen and Ravallion (2009) estimate that 64 
million people will fall into poverty as a consequence of the financial crisis in 2009 (using the $2.00/day 
threshold). The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID) estimates that 90 
million additional people will be poor by the end of 2010 (using the $1.25/day poverty line) (McCord and 
Vandermoortele 2009).  
There is broad agreement on the main channels through which the food, fuel, and financial crises 
affect developing countries (World Bank 2008; Ivanic and Martin 2009; Jones et al. 2009). Yet, the 
developmental impact of each of these crises and how these impacts might have affected each other is not 
well understood. In addition, impacts are likely to differ widely between different countries due to large 
differences in fiscal, trade, economic, and household structure. 
This paper considers Yemen, a net exporter of oil, a net importer of food, and one of the poorest 
countries in Asia. Before the series of crises hit Yemen, its government had prepared an ambitious five-
year plan with the main objectives of accelerating economic growth to 7.1 percent (from 3.8 percent 
between 2000 and 2006) and reducing poverty to 19.8 percent by 2010 (from 34.8 percent in 2005–2006) 
(MOPIC 2006). By 2007, the country had made some progress on the economic reforms envisaged to 
achieve these goals, including civil service and public financial management (PFM) reforms, adjustments 
to fuel subsidies in 2005, and improvements to the social safety net (IMF 2009).  
Even before the double crisis hit the country, economic growth, structural diversification, and 
poverty reduction had been slow. The country faces several economic challenges, including rapidly 
depleting oil resources, slow economic diversification, fiscally unsustainable oil subsidies, and rapid 
population growth. Official unemployment rates have risen to around 16 percent in recent years, and 65 
percent of the population still resides in rural areas, where dependence on deteriorating natural resources 
threatens traditional sources of income from agriculture (World Bank 2007). In addition, the country faces 
severe political tensions, including a civil war in the country’s northern province of Saada and a 
secessionist movement in the south of Yemen. 
The objective of this paper is to decompose the effects of the food, fuel, and financial crises and 
to estimate their combined impacts on growth, agriculture, and poverty in Yemen. Due to the lack of 
consistent gross domestic product (GDP) figures for 2008 and the first three quarters of 2009 and 
information on poverty,
1
                                                       
1 The Central Statistics Office (CSO) is in the process of restructuring and rebasing national accounts and other economic 
indicators. 
 we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the impacts 
of the crises on the Yemeni economy. We link these results to a microsimulation module to assess the 
impacts of these crises on poverty. Section 2 presents the main channels of impact in the country context 
of Yemen and discusses potential interlinkages between these channels. Section 3 presents a new dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model for Yemen and explains the progressive approach to 
implement the crises scenarios. Section 4 first describes the model’s baseline results from 2007 to 2010 
and then subsequently adds the food, fuel, and financial crisis impacts to assess the combined impacts on 
growth and poverty. Section 5 concludes.2 
2.  CRISES IMPACT CHANNELS IN YEMEN 
Yemen remains relatively insulated from global financial markets, yet the food and fuel crises and the 
financial crisis may impact the country through several real economy channels. On the macro level, 
impacts of the food, fuel, and financial crises depend on the economic structure, patterns and balances of 
trade, balance and composition of the government budget, and the sources of foreign exchange inflows. 
On the micro level, sources of household incomes and expenditures patterns determine the size and 
direction of crises impacts. These channels will be the focus of the analysis discussed in the following 
sections.  
Similar to many other mineral resource–rich countries, Yemen has an economy dominated by the 
mining sector (oil) and nontradable services; manufacturing and export-oriented services make up a 
relatively small share of the economy. In 2007, the oil sector accounted for 22 percent of total GDP; 
services contributed half to GDP; and the remainder was split between construction-dominated industry 
(15 percent) and agriculture (10 percent) (see Table 2 in Section 4). In the agricultural sector, qat,
2
Economic growth in Yemen averaged 3.8 percent during 2000–2006, with service and industrial 
growth (mainly construction) as the main drivers (Figure 1). This service- and construction-led growth is 
linked to government spending from oil revenues through both public investments, mostly in urban areas, 
and recurrent spending. About 30 percent of the workforce is employed with the government, and 
windfall gains from oil are often associated with rising public sector wages and infrastructure 
investments, mostly in urban areas. However, this growth model is challenged by declining oil reserves 
and the lack of new oil finds. Unless new oil fields are discovered, it is estimated that Yemen will run out 
of oil resources in the next 20 to 30 years, indicating that the oil sector will contract at a speed of 2–3 
percent annually. Yemen is likely to become a net oil importer in the next 5 to 10 years even with 
continued oil production due to rapidly increasing domestic consumption that is highly subsidized 
(MOPIC 2009). Some of the decline in the oil sector will be compensated by the exploitation of gas that 
is scheduled to start production in 2010, yet these revenues will be unlikely to balance decreasing oil 
revenues (EIU 2009). 
 fruits, 
vegetables, and livestock are the most important products in value terms, but cereal production, for which 
world food prices rose most rapidly during the food crisis, constitutes only 10 percent of value-added 
agricultural (Breisinger and McCool 2009).  
Agricultural growth has been volatile due to the sector’s high dependence on rainfall and the 
generally harsh natural conditions, especially the increasing scarcity of water. Although total growth in 
agriculture averaged 3.0 percent between 2000 and 2006, continued rapid population growth has meant no 
agricultural growth on a per capita basis. Moreover, agricultural growth fell to 1 percent in more recent 
years since 2004, which further underscores the big challenges facing agriculture in Yemen. 
                                                       
2 Qat is an evergreen plant with leaves that are widely used as stimulants in Yemen. The crop contributes about 30 percent to 
value-added agricultural and uses 40 percent of irrigation water. 3 
Figure 1. Annual GDP growth rates by sector, 2000–2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CSO 2007 and 2008. 
Yemen’s trade patterns make it an interesting case to assess the joint impacts of the food and fuel 
crises. In terms of exports, Yemen is heavily dependent on oil, which made up 90 percent of the country’s 
total exports in the past decade (Figure 2). The remaining exports are mainly agricultural products 
including coffee, tobacco, fish, and animal products, as well as some light manufacturing products. In 
terms of imports, Yemen is one of the countries that is most dependent on food imports in the world. In 
Yemen, 55 percent of food products consumed are imported, and 90 percent of wheat (the main staple) is 
imported. Total food imports account for about 20 percent of total imports, other consumer goods account 
for 10 percent, and the rest of imports are about equally split between capital goods and refined fuel.  
Figure 2. Oil and food trade, 2000–2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank 2009a. 
Oil also dominates the government budget and related services. In terms of government revenue, 
about three-quarters of the budget stems from oil revenues, indicating that swings in world oil prices 
directly affect the government budget. On the spending side, the fuel subsidy constitutes a big burden for 4 
the government, particularly when oil prices are high.
3
Oil constitutes 90 percent of exports and is also the most important source for foreign exchange 
earnings, contributing about three-quarters to total foreign exchange inflows in 2007 (Figure 3). The rest 
of the inflows are primarily remittances sent by Yemenis who work abroad, making it an important source 
of income at both the macro and the household levels (IMF 2009). There is broad agreement that 
remittances declined in the recent crisis period; the estimated range is –5 percent to –20 percent (MOPIC 
2009; IMF 2009; World Bank 2009c). While foreign direct investment (FDI) started to increase recently, 
the bulk of it is concentrated in the mining sector, traditionally in oil and more recently in the gas sector 
to develop liquefied natural gas facilities. Other sectors that have received FDI include tourism, real 
estate, and to a limited extent manufacturing, mainly from Gulf countries (World Bank 2009e). About 1 
percent of the government budget, or 75 billion YER, comes from development assistance (ODA in the 
form of loans and grants, suggesting that a possible crunch in global development aid might not have 
significant effect in Yemen (EIU 2009). Moreover, the ODI number seems not to include extrabudgetary 
development assistance in the form of programs and projects. For example, a recent report suggests that 
the Yemeni government received US$2 billion in emergency assistance from Saudi Arabia in 2009 (EIU 
2009).  
 Due to the lack of domestic refining capacities, 
Yemen imports most of the fuel consumed domestically. In 2007, for example, oil subsidies accounted for 
about one-quarter of government expenditure, almost the same as the spending on public employees’ 
wages and salaries (about 26 percent). Thus, the high costs of fuel subsidies partly offset windfall gains to 
the government.  
Given the government’s dependence on oil revenues, fiscal space for stimulus-type measures to 
cushion negative impacts of the financial crisis and global recession is limited. On the contrary, the 
government has reportedly cut back on its budget in 2009; different sources estimate the reduction in 
spending between 10 and 50 percent compared with 2008 levels (MOPIC 2009). Cutbacks include the 
freeze in replacements of retired government employees and reductions in social spending (MOPIC 
2009). These crises-related reductions in public spending are likely to be exacerbated by war-related 
spending in Yemen’s Saada region, which is estimated to cost US$2–3 million per day. 
Box 1. Government responses to the food crisis 
The Yemeni government has introduced a number of policies and actions specifically to mitigate the 
adverse effects of soaring food prices on the population. Short-term actions have included training 
bakeries to produce bread from mixed cereals, standardizing the weight and size of bread loaves, drafting 
plans to increase the number of beneficiaries of the social welfare fund to reach more than one million, 
and raising government and staff salaries by US$15 per month. Midterm actions have included 
conducting studies on reducing prices and learning from other countries’ experiences—such as those of 
Egypt, which has removed import taxes on staples, increased the amount of assistance to beneficiaries, 
purchased local cereals from farmers, and encouraged farmers to plant wheat. Planned long-term actions 
include a focus on reducing wheat and wheat flour imports, building government cereal silos to encourage 
more imports by the private sector, and encouraging the local production of wheat by supporting local 
farmers (WFP 2008). 
Source: Adapted from Jones et al. 2009. 
                                                       
3 Petrol prices are fixed. One liter of diesel and petrol sells for 35 YER and 60 YER at the pump, respectively. 5 
Figure 3. Share of oil revenue in the government budget 
       
Source: Calculations based on IMF 2009. 
Progress in poverty reduction has been modest when growth is largely oil driven, and 34.8 
percent of Yemenis lived below the poverty line in 2006 before the crises hit (World Bank 2007). Poverty 
among rural households stood at 40.1 percent compared with 20.7 percent for urban households. 
Moreover, for those households that are not classified as poor but whose income level is very close to the 
poverty line, vulnerability to falling back into poverty is high. For example, a reduction of per capita 
income by US$0.50 per day would increase the number of poor by 15 percentage points (POVCAL 
2009), indicating a very high vulnerability to external shocks such as the food, fuel, and financial crises. 
On the expenditure side, food makes up the largest share of household spending and accounts for more 
than half of the total household expenditure (Figure 4). As expected, these shares are even higher for poor 
households, which spend about 60 percent of their income on food—35 percent on cereals alone. 
However, even households that are not poor spend a significant share of income on food, 58 percent for 
rural and 44 percent for urban households.  
Constrained by climate, water, and other agroecological conditions, the vast majority of Yemeni 
households are net food buyers, even in rural areas. For the nation as a whole, only 4 percent of rural 
households are net food sellers. The share among the poor is even lower, as 97 percent of poor rural 
households are net food buyers. Only 15 percent of the population live in farm households.
4
On the income side, the majority of an average Yemeni household income comes from wage 
labor and self-employment. Remittances also constitute a relatively large source of income for 
households: 9 percent of total household income stems from this source, about half of the total going to 
rural and half to urban households.  
 As opposed 
to the dominant role of food consumption, fuel consumption as a share of an average household’s total 
expenditure is low (2 percent) considering that fuel is heavily subsidized in the country. More 
importantly, with the subsidy in place, potential indirect impacts through increased costs of intermediate 
inputs and transportation are expected to be low even in times of fuel price spikes. 
                                                       
4 Farm households are defined as households that earn more than 60 percent of their income from agriculture. Calculation is 






(in billion Yemeni rials)





Main foreign exchange sources   (in 
billion Yemeni rials)
Oil exports Remittances (net)
FDI (net) Loans and grants6 
Figure 4. Poverty and net food position of households 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CSO 2007. 
In summary, the country-specific examination of the importance of main crises transmission 
channels indicates that both swings in oil and food prices and changes in remittances are likely to have 
strong impacts on growth and poverty in Yemen. FDI and ODI inflows are unlikely to be affected by the 
crises. In the next section we present a model to quantify the impacts from each of the main channels and 
to analyze their joint effects on growth and poverty.  7 
3.  A CGE MODEL TO ASSESS THE CRISIS IMPACTS IN YEMEN 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model presented in this section captures the major channels 
through which the food, fuel, and financial crises impact the Yemeni economy and households. The CGE 
model is dynamic and thus also captures the links between the three crises that occur during several years. 
To develop a dynamic CGE (DCGE) model for Yemen, we first built a new social accounting matrix 
(SAM) to represent Yemen’s economy in 2007 as the main database for the model.
5 Major data sources 
for SAM construction include national accounts and the latest supply-use table from the Central Statistics 
Organization (CSO), Balance of Payments from the Bank of Yemen (BoY), government budget data from 
the Ministry of Finance, the 2008 Agricultural Yearbook from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 
and the latest Household Budget Survey (HBS 2005/2006) (CSO 2007).
6
Major general features of the model are explained in Appendixes B and C; however, several 
specific features are built in to account for the relatively short-term horizon of the simulation period 
(2007–2010).  
 These data sources are 
complemented with information from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The SAM is 
very detailed at the production, commodity, factor, and household levels and includes 65 production 
sectors (activities), 65 commodities, 15 factors of production, and 12 household types (for a detailed list 
see Appendix Table A.1). Factors of production include labor according to the skill level (unskilled, 
semiskilled, and skilled) and employment by the public and private sector. An aggregate version of the 
SAM (Macro SAM) can be found in Appendix Table A.2.  
First, to account for the limited options to shift capital from one sector to the next, we assume that 
most capital is sector specific. Only 10 percent of the total capital is economywide; thus the dynamics in 
capital formation are limited. Oil capital is fixed and declining at an annual rate of 2.4 percent to account 
for the declining oil resources. Second, land for most crops, especially perennial crops, is fixed to account 
for the limited supply responsiveness of the agricultural sector to short-term price shocks. Third, for 
unskilled and semiskilled labor employed in the private sector, we assume fixed wages; therefore, 
unemployment rises as a consequence of declining outputs in sectors that employ these labor types. For 
skilled labor and labor working in the public sector, we assume flexible wages and full employment, 
implying that in times of recession wages and thus incomes of households fall. In summary, this model 
setup accounts for the short-term nature of price shocks to assess growth and poverty impacts. Structural 
change caused by the reallocation of labor and capital is only captured to a limited extent.  
The model is calibrated to the new Yemen SAM; that is, the base year of the model is consistent 
with the structure of the Yemeni economy in 2007. We then develop a baseline (or business-as-usual) 
scenario in which the Yemeni economy continues to grow along its 2000–2006 growth path at the 
aggregate-sector level (agriculture, industry, services) between 2007 and 2010. The baseline also takes 
into account the shrinking oil production and thus serves as a counterfactual to show what would have 
happened in the absence of the food, fuel, and financial crises. In this baseline scenario as well as in all 
other scenarios, we assume that the nominal exchange rate is fixed in the short term to account for the 
quasi peg of the Yemeni rial (YER) to the U.S. dollar. However, the real exchange rate is an endogenous 
variable, which is affected by changes in domestic and world prices. The other exogenous variables, 
besides the nominal exchange rate, include government consumption, transfers to households, foreign 
inflows, population growth, and hence growth of the workforce, which all grow exogenously according to 
their historic trends in recent years. Investments are savings driven, and savings grow proportionally to 
household incomes. The government budget is flexible, which means that the government can adjust to 
changes in revenues and spending by increasing or decreasing the budget deficit. At the sector level, total 
                                                       
5 Special thanks for excellent research assistance from Christen McCool, who processed the HBS 2005/2006 for all 
household income and expenditure information that is used in the SAM. 
6 Data quality and availability can be challenging in Yemen since the data management system in Yemen is in a time of 
transition with major overhauls of the national accounting system. However, one of the strengths of social accounting matrixes is 
to reconcile different data sources, which can help to improve data estimates.  8 
factor productivity (TFP) increases exogenously to account for the differential growth patterns across 
sectors.  
The DCGE model also links to a microsimulation model, which allows for the endogenous 
estimation of growth impacts on poverty reduction. All HBS sample households are included in the 
microsimulation model, and their total expenditures and expenditures on each commodity or commodity 
group are linked to each of the 12 representative households included in the DCGE model according to 
their locations. The linkages between the DCGE and microsimulation models allow for the analysis of 
microimpact of the changes in representative households’ consumption induced by changes in their 
incomes, changes in market prices, and other factors. The endogenous changes derived from the DCGE 
model for the 12 representative households are used to recalculate consumption expenditure of their 
corresponding households in the survey dataset. New levels of total consumption expenditures are 
recalculated based on individual households’ budgets; and the new poverty rates for each region, rural and 
urban, and the national total are obtained by comparing expenditure levels (in real terms) to the official 
poverty line defined for HBS. 
Consistent with the changes in the recent years, we model the food and fuel crisis in 2008 and the 
financial crisis in 2009 by designing the three sets of scenarios. The scenarios follow the general price 
trends observed from 2007 to 2010, when food and oil prices rose dramatically in 2008, fell back in 2009, 
but have stayed above 2007 levels throughout 2009 and into 2010. The change in government spending 
and remittances related to the financial crisis follows trends observed in the country during 2009 and then 
returns to precrisis annual growth levels in 2010. 
The first set of scenarios focuses on the food and fuel crises and is modeled as a one-time 
increase in world food and oil/fuel prices. As in most standard single-country CGE models, world prices 
for imports and exports are exogenous while imports and exports are endogenous in response to changes 
in the world prices relative to the domestic prices for similar goods. In the scenario combining both the 
food and the fuel crises, we exogenously increase the 2008 world prices for food products by 20–100 
percent and oil and fuel prices by 20 percent in the model, and the prices fall to the projected 2009 levels 
and remain at these levels thereafter (see Table 1 for the level of price shock in the scenario and Appendix 
Figure A.1 for the actual world price change). To decompose the potentially differential impacts of the 
food and fuel crises, we also consider two counterfactual scenarios that reflect the food crisis only and the 
fuel crisis only. In the fuel crisis only and in the food and fuel joint scenarios we also consider higher 
government spending as a consequence of windfall gains from the oil boom; that is, a –20 percent annual 
growth rate for government consumption spending is assumed based on information from MOPIC, 
whereas in a normal year without shock, the growth rate is 3.8 percent. 
The second set of scenarios analyzes the impacts of the financial crisis and related global 
recession. As discussed in Section 2, we focus mainly on the trade and remittances channels. Similar to 
the food and fuel crisis scenarios, we consider both the isolated and joint effects in the simulations. The 
first financial crisis scenario (Scenario 4 in Table 1) is designed to capture the trade effect only by 
lowering the world prices for all the goods that Yemen imports or exports. Specifically, the 2009 world 
food prices are assumed to fall by 14–33 percent, and prices for major consumer and investment goods 
fall by 10 percent compared with 2008 levels. These price changes are as projected and consistent with 
the drop in prices under the food and fuel crises scenario in 2009. In addition, under this scenario the 
government spending is reduced by 20 percent (instead of increasing by 3.8 percent in the baseline) in 
2009 due to the sharp drop in oil revenues. The second financial crisis scenario (Scenario 5 in Table 1) 
reflects the drop of remittances received by Yemeni households from their overseas relatives, which is 
modeled as a 10 percent decline in foreign inflows received by the households in 2009. The joint effect of 
these two scenarios constitutes Scenario 6 in Table 1, the financial crisis scenario.  9 
Table 1. Model scenarios and assumptions  
   
Growth rate/changes in selected exogenous variables 
  Export/import prices 












First set of scenarios 
   Food and fuel crises: Changes in 2008  
       
       Scenario 1: Fuel crisis only  20, oil price only  5.0  5.0   
       Scenario 2: Food crisis only  20–100, food prices 
only* 
3.8  5.0   
       Scenario 3: Food and fuel crises    5.0  5.0   
   Food and fuel crises: Changes in 2009  as in Scenario 6   
Second set of scenarios 
   Financial crisis: Changes in 2009  
       
       Scenario 4: Trade  –14 to –33 for food 
prices* 
–10 for consumer and 
investment good 
prices  
–20.0  5.0   
       Scenario 5: Remittances    3.8  –10.0   
       Scenario 6: Financial crisis  –14 to –33 for food 
prices* 
–10 for consumer and 
investment good 
prices 
–10.0  –10.0   
Third set of scenarios: 
   Food, fuel, and financial crises:  
   Changes in  2008–2009 
       
       Scenario 7: Combined  Combined (Scenarios 3 & 6) 
 
 
Source: Information for foreign transfers from IMF 2009; government consumption follows 2000–2006 growth trend; TFP and 
world price changes from IMF 2009, World Bank 2009b, and IFPRI staff estimates.  
Note: *Cereals and dairy products only. Population grows at 3 percent annually (UN 2009) and is the same across all scenarios.  
Finally, we combine the food and fuel crises with the financial crisis in an additional scenario 
(Scenario 7 in Table 1) to assess the overall effect of this series of crises on growth and poverty between 
2008 and 2010. Table 1 presents the shocks imposed on the model for each of the scenarios described 
above.  10 
4.  IMPACTS OF THE FOOD, FUEL, AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
Under the model’s baseline, the Yemeni economy grows along its past trend at an average of 3.7 percent 
annually from 2007 to 2009. The baseline captures the continued decline in oil revenues and the negative 
growth in the sector’s GDP (–2.2 percent annually), together with growth rates of the agricultural sector 
between 2.2 and 3.0 percent, higher growth of the nonoil industry (8.6–11.0 percent) led by growth in the 
gas and construction sectors, and average annual growth of 5.0 to 5.6 percent in the services sectors 
(Table 2, top panel). The decline in oil output negatively affects GDP growth, resulting in a GDP growth 
rate reduction to 3.6 percent in 2009. The gas sector grows through investments in 2009 and commencing 
gas production in late 2009 and accelerates overall growth to 4.1 percent in the baseline; however, this 
will only be a one-time effect and is expected to abate from 2011 on. In addition, it is expected that the 
production of gas will not be able to compensate for the declining oil revenues.  
On the expenditure side of GDP, private consumption remains the dominant factor, constituting 
59.6 percent of GDP in 2007 and 57.0 percent by 2010 (Table 2, bottom panel). The decline in the private 
consumption share of GDP is mirrored in the increase in the investment and government consumptions 
shares, while share of exports in the GDP falls due to declining oil output. While the trade deficit remains 
constant by design, as a ratio to GDP it rises between 2007 and 2010.  
The poverty analysis is conducted by linking a microsimulation model with the DCGE model. 
Accordingly, with modest change in per capita GDP in the baseline, the poverty rate in rural and urban 
areas remains relatively constant, and the national poverty rate increases only slightly from 34.8 percent 
in 2006 to 35.6 percent by 2010. The modest increase in the national poverty rate is led by the rise in 
urban poverty (from 20.7 percent in 2007 to 23.9 percent in 2010), while the poverty rate for rural 
households as a whole stays constant at 40.1 percent due to generally weaker linkages between oil 
revenues and rural household incomes. 
Table 2. Baseline growth for selected economic indicators (comparable with 2000–2006 historical 
average) 
   2007  2007  2008  2009  2010 
GDP  Share  Annual growth (%) 
GDP (million YER)  4,640  3.9  3.9  3.6  4.1 
      Agriculture  9.5  3.0  3.0  2.3  2.2 
      Oil  22.3  –2.2  –2.2  –2.2  –2.2 
      Nonoil industry  14.8  9.8  9.8  9.5  11.0 
      Services   53.5  5.6  5.6  5.0  5.5 
GDP by expenditure share  100  100  100  100  100 
      Private consumption/GDP  59.6  58.5  58.5  57.8  57.0 
      Investment/GDP  30.8  32.3  32.3  33.3  34.4 
      Government 
consumption/GDP  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5 
      Exports/GDP  35.1  33.7  33.7  32.4  31.1 
      Imports/GDP  –42.0  –40.9  –40.9  –40.0  –39.1 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)     1.00  0.98  0.95  0.91 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
In summary, the results of the baseline simulations show that the model captures past sector-level 
and poverty trends well. We therefore use this model to assess the impacts of the food, fuel, and financial 
crises that hit Yemen consecutively between 2008 and 2009. 11 
Impacts of the Food and Fuel Crises 
We first focus on the aggregate impacts of the food and fuel crises on overall growth, agricultural growth, 
and poverty in Yemen. Consistent with the observation between 2000 and 2007, the model simulation 
shows a positive growth effect of the oil price spike under the fuel-crisis-only scenario. Total GDP 
growth accelerates to 5.9 percent in 2008, up from a 3.8 percent annual average in the baseline. Growth is 
driven by the oil sector and the related increase in public spending on construction and services. On the 
contrary, when only the food crisis is considered, without the oil price increase, the GDP growth rate 
decelerates to 3.1 percent in 2008 before recovering in 2009 to the precrisis level. The growth decline 
caused by the food crisis can be primarily explained by increased food consumption costs and lowered 
nonfood spending at given income levels, which in turn negatively affect growth in nonfood sectors. On 
the other hand, the agricultural sector benefits from high food prices as a result of the food crisis. 
However, the agricultural supply response to higher prices is only a short-term phenomenon. When food 
prices stop increasing in 2009, agricultural growth falls sharply from its peak in 2008.   
The third scenario examines the joint impacts of the food and fuel crises, which occurred quasi-
simultaneously in 2008. As demonstrated in Figure 5, the food and fuel crises have opposite effects on 
growth, and the overall impact is thus an S-shaped curve that is smoother than the sharp S-curve of the 
fuel crisis alone. However, the positive growth effect of the oil crisis is stronger than the negative effect 
of the food crisis. The overall effect of the two crises on GDP is thus positive: Annual growth in GDP 
accelerates to 5.2 percent, up from 3.8 percent in the baseline, indicating Yemen is a net beneficiary of the 
joint crisis. The result of this scenario is close to preliminary GDP growth rate estimates by the CSO 
(2009), and slightly higher than the World Bank’s estimate of 4.4 percent for 2008 (World Bank 2009e). 
Figure 5. Growth impacts of the food and fuel crises 
 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
The growth effect of the joint food and fuel crisis is positive, yet the effects at the sector and 
household levels may be very different. Thus, we first examine the joint effect on growth in the 
agricultural, oil, nonoil, and service sectors and then discuss the differential poverty impact between rural 
and urban households. 
The oil price spike and associated windfall gains to the government drives growth in the service 
sector, while growth in the nonoil industry sector is modest under the food and fuel crises scenario. 
Growth in the nonoil industry output is led by the construction sector, which benefits from an increase in 
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of high world cereal prices. High world cereal prices cause a relative increase in all domestic food prices 
and thus accelerate agricultural growth to 8.4 percent. However, higher food prices also cause a reduction 
in consumer spending on nonfood items, which hits services especially hard. The two main sector-level 
impacts, the oil-driven service sector boom and the agricultural sector growth driven by the food price 
spike, are only temporary and cannot be sustained. Once food and fuel prices fall in 2009, both sectors see 
sharp drops in growth before they return to precrisis levels.  
Figure 6. Growth impacts of the food and fuel crises by sector 
     
 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
While the agricultural sector benefits from a scenario of high food prices alone, the joint impacts 
of the food and fuel crises on the sector can be characterized as volatile growth caused by the fluctuations 
in world food prices. For the oil, service, and industrial sectors, growth accelerates only in the crisis year 
of 2008. With the assumption of a one-year price spike in 2008, growth in these nonagricultural sectors 
declines in 2009 and returns to the precrisis levels in 2010. 
Assessing the poverty impacts of the two crises is a major focus of this paper. The last household 
survey was conducted in 2005/2006, and previous attempts to update poverty estimates for Yemen have 
focused on the food crisis only. A simple poverty-updating exercise based on this survey shows that the 
food crisis might have caused poverty to increase in Yemen by 6 percentage points (World Bank 2009d). 
Our model results confirm this estimation and show that the food crisis has much stronger and 

























































































this result is the fact that the majority of Yemeni households are net buyers of food, which accounts for 
the largest share of their consumption budget, and the country as a whole heavily depends on food 
imports. Under the food-crisis-only scenario, the national poverty rate rises to 40.8 percent in 2008 from 
an estimated 34.8 percent in 2006. Both rural and urban poor households suffer under the food crisis: The 
poverty rate of urban households goes up 4.4 percentage points to 25.1 percent, and the rural poverty rate 
increases to 46.7 percent, from 40.1 percent in 2006. 
Figure 7. Poverty impacts of the food and fuel crises 
 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE model results.  
On the other hand, the oil price hike under the fuel-crisis-only scenario has limited effects on 
poverty. The main channels that cause poverty to change are the oil-related government transfers and 
other spending. The rise in government spending benefits urban households directly through additional 
public sector jobs and higher-wage incomes of public sector employees. On the other hand, benefits to 
rural households are more limited and mainly stem from increased direct transfer payments. Although 
there is evidence that existing social transfers are not well targeted to the poor, data from the HBS 
2005/2006 indicates that about half of government transfers go to rural households.  
Since rural households benefit little from the oil windfalls and most of the poor live in the rural 
areas, the effect of the joint food and fuel crisis on the poor is strongly dominated by the food crisis. In 
the joint crisis scenario (Scenario 3), the national poverty rate rises to 37.6 percent in 2008 and remains at 
higher-than-baseline levels thereafter. Thus, contrary to the recovery of overall economic growth in 2009, 
the poverty rates for both rural and urban households remain at 3.0 and 4.3 percentage points above 
baseline levels, respectively. This finding strongly suggests that continued high food prices make it 
especially hard for the poor to recover from food price shocks despite the relatively quick rebound of 






































































































In this precarious situation, when the poor were struggling to recover from the impacts of the 
food and fuel crises, the next crisis hit the global economy and Yemen. In the next section, we examine 
the isolated effects of the financial crisis first, before joining this crisis with the previous two to estimate 
the joint effect of the crises. 
Impacts of the Financial Crisis 
Yemen is relatively insulated from global financial markets, and thus the financial crisis mainly affects 
Yemen through real economy channels. Although Section 2 of this paper suggests two major channels 
through which the financial crisis might affect an economy like Yemen’s, the modeling analysis seems to 
indicate that the trade effect is the dominant factor (Figure 8).  
Figure 8. Growth impacts of the financial crisis 
 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
The negative impacts of falling world commodity prices are simulated in the trade-only scenario 
(Scenario 4) in which the export side effect is strongly dominated by the sharp reduction in the value of 
oil exports. The performance of other major export goods such as coffee, tobacco, and fruits remains 
stable, given that their prices only modestly change in 2009 (and thus we did not consider them in the 
model). Moreover, the decline in oil exports together with the related additional exogenous decline in 
government spending (as reported by government sources) causes a sharp contraction of other sectors, 
especially services and agriculture. The reduction in exports thus dominates the positive impacts due to 
lowered cost for imports during the financial crisis in Yemen.  
Under the trade-only financial crisis scenario, GDP growth drops to –0.2 percent in 2009; while 
in the remittance-only financial crisis scenario (Scenario 5), GDP growth slows to 3.0 percent in 2009. 
The relatively small growth effect from the reduction in remittances can be explained by the relatively 
small share of remittances in GDP and the modest size of the shock. Remittances constitute about 10 
percent of household incomes, and thus the 10 percent decline causes a 1 percent reduction in aggregate 
household income as a direct effect. This reduction in household incomes, however, generates second- 
and third-round indirect effects on the economy. Most importantly, reduced consumer spending affects 
growth at the sector level, including agriculture (Figure 9). 15 
Figure 9. Growth impacts of the financial crisis by sector 
   
 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
In Scenario 6, the financial crisis is modeled by jointly reducing trade and remittances. All sectors 
are hurt in this scenario, yet the degree of impact varies across sectors. The service sector is hit the most 
due to its strong linkages with the government sector (public services constitute a large share of total 
services), which is heavily dependent on oil revenues. The decline in government recurrent spending
7
These growth results under the model’s financial crisis scenario are consistent with the projection of 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2009, 14), in which GDP is predicted to fall to 5,665 billion YER in 
2009 from 5,735 billion YER in 2008 in nominal prices.
 
causes a decline in public sector employees’ real-wage income, either through a lower-wage rate or cut of 
government staff. While agriculture and nonoil industries are relatively more resilient to the financial 
crisis, growth in agriculture falls to 0.5 percent in 2009 from 3.6 in the same year’s baseline. Growth in 
nonoil industries drops by only 0.5 percentage points compared with the previous year, mainly caused by 
investments in the gas sector and production starting in late 2009. Thus, the sector is not affected by the 
crisis and compensates for growth losses in other subsectors in the nonoil category during 2009–2010. 
However, due to its relatively small size, the gas sector is unlikely to reverse negative effects from the 
decrease in oil export value. It is also unlikely to compensate for the weak performance in the service and 
agricultural sectors. 
8
                                                       
7 To capture the declines in government revenue due to declining oil exports, government spending other than savings, 
which is an exogenous variable available in the model, is assumed to fall by 10 percent in 2009. 
 More optimistic earlier projections were often 
8 There is some debate on the calculation of changes in real GDP between 2008 and 2009. There is agreement that nominal 
GDP fell and also that the consumer price index (CPI) increased. Deflating nominal GDP by the CPI would thus lead to a sharp 
contraction of the economy. However, due to Yemen’s distorted economic structure, it is theoretically possible that nominal GDP 
falls, consumer prices rise, and real GDP rises. This is because the GDP deflator is based on GDP shares (where oil plays an 
important role), whereas the CPI is based on consumption shares (where food and consumer goods are much more important). 16 
based on the assumption that gas exports commence in early 2009, which did not occur in reality. The 
International Monetary Fund, for example, projected 7.7 percent growth for 2009 annual growth in its 
joint staff report in March 2009. 
Although there are different growth projections due to different assumptions on the impacts of the 
financial crisis and uncertainty on price deflators, most experts agree that the poverty rate has gone up as 
a consequence of the financial crisis. Results from our DCGE model show that poverty indeed increases 
from 34.8 percent in the baseline to 38.8 percent under the financial crisis scenario. These poverty effects 
at the national level are dominated by the remittances channel as opposed to the growth impact, which is 
dominated by the trade effect. Under the financial crisis scenario, the poverty rate increases by a modest 
1.5 percentage points due to the trade channel, while the rate of people living in poverty increases by 2.1 
percentage points as a consequence of the cut in remittances (Figure 10). Urban households are hit 
especially hard by the financial crisis. The sharp reduction in government spending and related job cuts in 
public services and reduced government transfers cause the urban poverty rate to rise by 6.0 percentage 
points in 2009, compared with a more modest increase of 2.7 percentage points in rural areas.  
Figure 10. Poverty impacts of the financial crisis 
 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
Joint Impacts of the Food, Fuel, and Financial Crises 
The previous scenarios have considered the impacts of both the food and fuel crises and the financial 
crisis sequentially but independently. In this section we present the result of a triple crisis scenario that 
joins the impacts of the food and fuel crisis with the financial crisis. In the absence of any official 
statistical or other type of data from the country for the last two years (2008 and 2009), this triple crisis 
scenario can be viewed as an estimation of growth and poverty trends in Yemen after 2007. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
So, for example, if oil prices fall (by more than output) and nonoil prices rise, then it is theoretically possible that the CPI rises 
but the GDP deflator falls. If this fall in the GDP deflator is substantial, real GDP might grow even though nominal GDP falls.  17 
Given that the food and fuel crises occurred mainly in 2008 and the financial crisis mainly in 
2009, the total crisis scenario displays a much more realistic picture of growth dynamics in recent years as 
compared with looking at each period individually (Figure 11). Without the financial crisis in 2009, the 
effect of the food and fuel crises on growth would have quickly phased out in the years after 2008. 
However, the onset of the financial crisis in 2009 has altered growth recovery and leads to a negative 
growth in GDP in 2009. Thus, the financial crisis, because it followed the food and fuel crises, not only 
slows down growth recovery but also makes the recovery after 2009 more difficult. Even under the 
assumption that the world returns to precrisis conditions and no further shock in 2010, growth remains at 
a level well below precrisis situation. The GDP growth rate in 2010 is only 3.1 percent, compared with 
3.8 percent in the baseline’s 2010 growth outcome.   
Figure 11. Growth impacts of the food, fuel, and financial crises 
 
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
At the sector level, the continued crisis hits services and agriculture especially hard, while the 
effect on the nonoil industry is relatively modest (Figure 12). This outcome is largely due to certain 
factors specific for Yemen, especially the kicking in of liquefied natural gas production in 2009 and 2010.  
Figure 12. Growth impacts of the food, fuel, and financial crises by sector 
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The triple crisis hit the poor doubly hard, especially rural households (Figure 13). Poverty was 
high during the food crisis, yet it is reaching new heights during the financial crisis. Had the financial 
crisis not occurred, the increase in poverty levels would have slowed due to falling food prices. However, 
instead of recovering, rural households were hit hard by a drop in remittances, and urban households, by 
both the drop in remittances and declining oil revenues.  
The additional shock of the financial crisis further raises the poverty rate to 42.8 percent in 2009, 
8 percentage points above precrisis levels. The poverty increase is severe for both rural and urban 
households (Figure 13). Poverty in rural areas increases to 47.6 percent, making almost every second rural 
inhabitant poor. In urban areas, poverty increases from 21.6 to 29.9 percent, thus pushing almost one-third 
of the urban population below the poverty line. 
Figure 13. Poverty impacts of the triple crisis 
 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE model results. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Many developing countries have been hard hit by a series of crises during 2007–2009, yet analytical 
evidence of their impact on development and how they might have affected each other remains scarce. 
This paper has attempted to shed light on these questions, thereby making contributions to both the 
understanding of crises interlinkages in general and the estimation of country-level postcrisis poverty 
rates for Yemen. Because the last household survey was conducted before the crises and there is 
uncertainty about the growth estimates, this study also serves as an estimation of growth and poverty 
trends between 2007 and 2009–2010, which are based on a consistent economic model. To capture the 
impacts of the triple crisis, we have considered changing world market prices, a drop in remittances, 
government spending, and trade. Yemen-specific additional features of our crisis modeling include the 
general decline in oil production and additional gas-sector investments and production in the country in 
2009 and 2010. 
We first decompose the impacts of the food crisis and the fuel crisis and show that the growth 
impacts are converse and countercyclical. While high oil prices have accelerated economywide growth, 
high food prices have slowed growth mainly through reduced private nonfood consumption. Oil-driven 
growth dominates the joint growth effect in the crisis year of 2008. However, this oil-driven growth has 
not been pro-poor; poverty under the combined food and fuel crisis rises sharply for both rural and urban 
households. 
Despite the lack of direct financial market links, real economy effects from the financial crisis 
lead to negative growth in the absence of any additional fiscal measures. The sharp drop in growth is 
dominated by the drop in oil prices and related decrease in government spending. Poverty effects of the 
financial crisis differ between rural and urban households. While urban households are hit hard by the 
collapse in trade and government spending, the net effect from trade channel impacts is neutral for rural 
households, mainly due to the positive effects of falling food prices. However, the drop in remittances 
affects both rural and urban households with the result of a sharp overall rise in poverty. 
On the sector level, results show that oil-dependent and poor countries like Yemen are especially 
vulnerable to global crises. The reduction in oil revenues and related spending cannot be compensated by 
lower prices for imports of food and consumer and investment goods. Although agriculture often 
stabilizes economic growth and household incomes in terms of crisis, this role of the sector is limited in 
Yemen due the relatively low share of the sector in GDP (10 percent) and the large share of net food-
buying households in Yemen (97 percent). 
The impacts of the financial crisis should not be seen in isolation from the preceding crises. 
While growth rebounds relative quickly after each shock, recovery from falling into poverty is a much 
slower process. Poverty effects from one crisis to the next add up and compound each other. In the case of 
Yemen, poverty increases from precrisis levels of 34.8 percent to 37.6 percent in 2008 and 42.8 in 2009. 
These estimates can be considered conservative, because we do not account for the ongoing war in Saada 
province and the related displacement of people and public spending cuts, severe electricity shortages, 
and major floods in Hadramout governorate that recently hit the country.  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURE 
Figure A.1. World commodity prices, 2006–2009 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using World Bank (2009b). Note: Q stands for quarter. 
 
 
Table A.1. SAM and Model Disaggregation 
Activities/commodities    Factors of production 
Agriculture  Industry (cont.)  Labor 
Sorghum  Other processing  Private sector, unskilled 
Maize  Fish processing  Private sector, semiskilled 
Millet  Textiles and clothing  Private sector, skilled 
Wheat  Leather and shoes  Public sector, unskilled 
Barley  Wood   Public sector, semiskilled 
Other grains  Paper  Public sector, skilled 
Bananas  Printing  Capital 
Grapes  Oil refining  Capital 
Mangoes  Chemicals  Oil capital 
Citrus fruits  Fertilizer and pesticides  Land 
Other fruits  Nonmetals  Land temperate highlands 
Potatoes  Metals  Land dry highlands 
Onions  Machinery  Land Red Sea and Tihama 
Tomatoes  Other manufacturing  Land Arab Sea 
Other vegetables  Electricity   Land internal plateau 
Pulses  Water  Land desert 
Coffee  Construction  Households* 
Sesame  Services  Urban 
Cotton  Trade  Temperate highlands 
Qat  Hotels and restaurants  Dry highlands 
Tobacco  Transport & communication  Red Sea and Tihama 
Camel  Business services  Arab Sea 
























































































































Table A.1. Continued 
Activities/commodities    Factors of production 
Agriculture  Industry (cont.)  Labor 
Chicken  Education  Desert 
Goats & sheep  Public services  Rural  
Fishery  Other services  Temperate highlands 
Forestry    Dry highlands 
Industry    Red Sea and Tihama 
Oil    Arab Sea 
Gas    Internal plateau 
Other mining    Desert 
Beverages     
Bread    Other accounts 
Other cereal-based food    Enterprise 
Dairy products    Government 
Vegetable oil    Direct taxes 
Sugar, processed    Sales taxes 
Camel meat    Import tariffs 
Beef meat    Savings & investment 
Poultry    Rest of world 
Goat & sheep meat     
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Table A.2. 2007 Macro SAM for Yemen 
Note: ROW = rest of the world 
 






tax  Invest  ROW  Total 
Activities     7,115                                7,115 
Commodities  2,477          2,642  722        1,340  1,545  8,725 
Labor  2,779                        2,779 
Capital  1,860                        1,860 
Enterprise         1,668      158          76  1,903 
Household       2,779  191  58    126          285  3,439 
Government           1,099      153  –289  44    271  1,278 
Direct tax           80  73              153 
Sales tax     –289                      –289 
Import tax     44                      44 
Savings           257  725  262          97  1,340 
ROW     1,855        409     10                 2,274 
Total  7,115  8,725  2,779  1,860  1,903  3,439  1,278  153  -289  44  1,340  2,274    23 
APPENDIX B: EXTENDED MODEL DESCRIPTION
9
The ability to capture intersector synergies, trade-offs, and linkages has made general equilibrium models 
an important tool in analyzing the impacts of growth accelerations. The DCGE model is an economywide, 
multisectoral model that solves simultaneously and endogenously for both quantities and prices of a series 
of economic variables. On the supply side, the model defines specific production functions for each 
economic activity. Assumptions that are made before calibrating the model to the data include constant 
returns-to-scale technology with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between primary inputs. This is 
a fundamentally necessary assumption for the model to reach a general equilibrium solution. For the 
substitution between primary and intermediate inputs in the production functions we assume a Leontief 
technology.  
 
The demand side of the CGE model is dominated by a series of consumer demand functions. This 
demand system is derived from well-defined utility functions. In our model, the consumer demand 
functions are solved from a Stone-Geary type of utility function in which the income elasticity is not at 
unity, and hence, the marginal budget share of each good consumed departs from its respective average 
budget share. Similar to other general equilibrium models, consumer income that enters the demand 
system is an endogenous variable in our model. Income generated from the primary factors employed in 
the production process is the dominant income source for consumers, while the model also considers 
incomes from abroad (as remittance received) or from the government (as direct transfers).  
The DCGE model explicitly models the relationship between supply and demand, which 
determines the equilibrium prices in domestic markets. To capture the linkages between the domestic and 
international markets, the model assumes price-sensitive substitution (imperfect substitution) between 
foreign goods and domestic production. Although the linkages between demand and supply through 
changes in income (an endogenous variable) and productivity (often an exogenous variable) are the most 
important general equilibrium interactions in an economywide model, production linkages also occur 
across sectors through the intermediate demand and competition for primary factors employed in 
production sectors. 
Investments affect production over time, and productivity growth is also a gradual process. 
Capturing this dynamic process is a key component of a DCGE model. Given the complexity of the 
model setup in terms of its large number of production sectors in both agriculture and nonagriculture, and 
its highly disaggregated agricultural production and household groups across subnational regions, it is 
unrealistic to develop a fully intertemporal general equilibrium model for this study.
10
To capture different agricultural production patterns and technologies at the subnational level, the 
SAM and DCGE models further disaggregate agricultural activities into six agroecological zones 
(temperate highlands, dry highlands, Red Sea and Tihama, Arabian Sea, internal plateau, desert) using 
district-level production data. Workers in the model can migrate between sectors and regions, although 
agricultural land remains within each region’s agricultural sectors. The skilled labor force grows more 
slowly than the rest of the workforce (unskilled and semiskilled).  
 Thus, we use a 
recursive dynamic model. With this model setup, the dynamics occur only between two periods at a time. 
Consumption smoothing along the growth path as well as the intertemporal investment and saving 
decisions are not taken into account. Instead, private investment and hence capital accumulation are 
determined by a Solow type of saving decision in which savings are proportional to the income and not 
endogenously solved from a Ramsey type of intertemporal utility function. Population growth, land 
expansion at the subnational and national levels, and productivity growth are all exogenously determined. 
Mathematic presentation and corresponding model parameters and variables are listed in Appendix B.   
The SAM and DCGE models further disaggregate households into subnational groups in both 
rural and urban areas. Information on income distribution from labor and land derived from HBS 
                                                       
9 The model description is based on Breisinger, Diao, and Thurlow 2009. 
10 An intertemporal general equilibrium model in literature is often with relatively aggregated economic structure. See Diao 
et al. (2005) for the growth linkage analysis in the case of Thailand as an example.    24 
2005/2006 is used to calibrate the initial income distribution of the model. In general, returns to land, 
labor, and capital employed in agricultural production at the regional level go to the region’s rural 
household group, and returns to capital employed in nonagricultural production and wage income of 
skilled labor go to urban households. Rural households also earn labor income from nonagricultural 
activities, which can occur either in the rural (i.e., rural nonfarm) or in the urban areas. Income elasticities 
of households’ demand functions are estimated using consumption expenditure data from HBS 
2005/2006. 
Both the SAM and the DCGE models include a government account, which collects direct taxes 
from households and indirect taxes from imports, exports, and domestic sales, and then supplements its 
revenues with foreign grants from development partners that are used for investment expenditures. 
Information on government revenues and expenditures was provided by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning. 
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APPENDIX C: CORE MODEL EQUATIONS 
Table C.1. Mathematic presentation of DCGE model—sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Sets 
  Activities    Commodities not in CE 
 
Activities with a Leontief 
function at the top of the 
technology nest 




  Commodities    Commodities not in CM 
  Commodities with domestic 
sales of domestic output    Commodities with 
domestic production  
  Commodities not in CD    Factors 
  Exported commodities     Households 
Equation parameters 
cpi   Consumer price index    
0–1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
  Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI   
Export price (foreign 
currency) 
  Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a 
 
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per unit of c' 
produced and sold domestically 
 
Share of net income of i' 
to i (i' ∈ INSDNG'; i ∈ 
INSDNG) 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per exported unit of 
c' 
  Tax rate for activity a 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per imported unit of 
c'  
i tins   Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
0–1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit    Import tariff rate 
i mps  
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i 
 
  Rate of sales tax 
aA ∈ () c CEN C ∈⊂
() a ALEO A ∈⊂
cC ∈ () c CMN C ∈⊂
() c CD C ∈⊂ () c CX C ∈⊂
() c CDN C ∈⊂ fF ∈
() c CE C ∈⊂ () h H INSDNG ∈⊂
i mps01
c cwts c pwe
ca ica if shif
' cc icd ' ii shii
' cc ice a ta
' cc icm
a inta i tins01
a iva c tm
c tq26 
Table C.1. Continued   
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Equation parameters, continued 
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function 
t
cr δ   CET function share parameter 
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function 
  CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
 
Shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function   
Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
  Armington function shift parameter    Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
  CET function shift parameter         CES production function exponent 
a β  
Capital sectoral mobility factor    CES value-added function exponent 
 
Marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed commodity c for 
household h 
 
Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
  CES activity function share parameter    Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function    CET function exponent 
q
cr δ   Armington function share parameter 
a
fat η   Sector share of new capital 
f υ   Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous variables 
fsav   Foreign savings   c qg   Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
i mps  
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic nongovernment institution 
(exogenous variable) 
c qinv   Base-year quantity of private 
investment demand 
  Import price (foreign currency)    Transfer from factor f to institution i 
  Quantity of stock change  fa wfdist   Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
f qfs   Quantity supplied of factor     
Endogenous variables 
a
ft AWF  
Average capital rental rate in time 
period t 
  Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input 
IADJ   Investment adjustment factor    Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
  Government expenditures    Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
  Consumption spending for household  cr QM   Quantity of imports of commodity c 
  Exchange rate     Activity price (unit gross revenue) 
  Government savings  c PD   Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically 
  Quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a  cr PE   Supply price for commodity produced 
and sold domestically 
  Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
  Export price (domestic currency) 
 
Quantity of household home 
consumption of commodity c from 
activity a for household h 









































ch QH a PINTA
ach QHA27 
Table C.1. Continued 
Symbol  Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous variables, continued 
cr PM  
Unit price of capital in time 
period t  
  Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of commodity 
  Import price (domestic 
currency) 
   Quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
  Composite commodity price    Transfers from institution i' to i 
(both in the set INSDNG) 
  Value-added price (factor 
income per unit of activity) 
  Average price of factor 
  Aggregate producer price for 
commodity 
  Income of factor f 
  Producer price of commodity c 
for activity a    Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of activity    Income of domestic 
nongovernment institution 
cr QE   Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output 
  Income to domestic institution 
i from factor f 
 
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
a
fat K   Quantity of new capital by 
activity a for time period t 
  Quantity of (aggregate) value-
added     
 
c QX
c PQ ac QXAC
a PVA ' ii TRII
c PX f WF
ac PXAC f YF
a QA YG




Table C.2. Mathematic presentation of DCGE model—model equations 
Production and price equations 
   





= ⋅ ∑   (2) 
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= ⋅ ⋅⋅ 
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a va vaf va vaf
fa f a a fa fa fa fa fa fa
fF
W WFDIST PVA QVA QF QF





⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ 
 ∑   (4) 
a aa QVA iva QA = ⋅  (5) 
a aa QINTA inta QA = ⋅   (6) 
(1 ) a aa a a a a PA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA ⋅− ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅   (7) 
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⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅  
 ∑   (11) 
'
'
cr cr c c c
c CT
PE pwe EXR PQ ice
∈





c cr cr c cr c
rr

























  (14) 
c cr c
r
 = QD QE QX +∑   (15) 
c c c c cr cr
r
PX QX PD QD PE QE ⋅ = ⋅+ ⋅ ∑   (16) 
( ) ''
'
1 cr cr cr c c  c
c CT
PM pwm tm EXR PQ icm
∈
= ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅ ∑   (17) 
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Table C.2.Continued 
Production and price equations 







c cr cr c cr c
rr
 =   + (1- ) QQ QM QD
ρ ρρ αδ δ

⋅⋅ ⋅ 










QM PD  =








  (19) 
c c cr
r
 =    QQ QD QM +∑   (20) 
( ) 1 c c c c c cr cr
r





= ⋅ ∑   (22) 
Institutional incomes and domestic demand equations 
   
f f fa fa
aA
YF  = WF   wfdist QF
∈
⋅⋅ ∑   (23) 
if if f YIF  = shif YF ⋅   (24) 
'
''
i i f i i i gov i row
f F i INSDNG
YI  =  YIF TRII trnsfr cpi trnsfr EXR
∈∈
+ + ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑   (25) 
' ' ' '' ii ii i i i TRII  = shii (1-mps ) (1-tins ) YI ⋅⋅⋅   (26) 
( ) 11 h ih h h h
i INSDNG
EH  =  shii mps (1-tins ) YI
∈

− ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ 




c c h c ch ch h c c h
cC
PQ QH  = PQ EH PQ γβ γ
∈

⋅ ⋅+⋅ − ⋅ 
 ∑   (28) 
cc QINV  = IADJ qinv ⋅   (29) 
c c i gov
c C i INSDNG
EG PQ qg trnsfr cpi
∈∈
= ⋅+ ⋅ ∑∑   (30) 
ii c c c c cc
i INSDNG c CMNR c C
gov f gov row
fF








  (31) 
System constraints and macroeconomic closures 
   
c ca ch c c c
aA hH
QQ QINT QH qg QINV qdst
∈∈





= ∑   (33) 
YG EG GSAV = +   (34) 30 
Table C.2. Continued   
System constraints and macroeconomic closures 
   
cr cr cr cr i row
r c CMNR r c CENR i INSD
pwm QM pwe QE trnsfr fsav
∈ ∈∈
⋅ = ⋅+ + ∑ ∑∑  (35) 
( ) 1 i i i c c cc
i INSDNG c C c C
mps tins YI GSAV EXR fsav PQ QINV PQ qdst
∈ ∈∈
⋅− ⋅ + + ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ∑ ∑∑   (36) 
Factor accumulation and allocation equations (applies to capital only) 
   
'
f  a t a
f t f t f a  t






  = ⋅⋅  
   
∑ ∑




f  a t f t f  a t aa
f  a t a





   ⋅  = ⋅ ⋅ −+          ∑
  (38) 
c t c t
aa c







 ∆=⋅  

∑
  (39) 
'
c t






= ⋅ ∑ ∑
  (40) 
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